View the feedback we have received on the Heavy Vehicle National Law statutory instruments consultation paper.

• Do you have any feedback specific to the draft Safety Management System (SMS) Standard or the accompanying Schedule 1 – SMS Evidence Requirements?

  I appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback on the draft Safety Management System (SMS) Standard and the accompanying Schedule 1 – SMS Evidence Requirements. While I support any initiative intended to improve safety performance across the heavy vehicle and supply chain sectors, I hold serious concerns that the proposed model introduces excessive duplication, regulatory overlap, and an unreasonable compliance burden—particularly for small and medium-sized operators. The heavy vehicle industry is already subject to significant legal obligations under the Heavy Vehicle National Law (HVNL), which establishes primary duties requiring all parties in the chain of responsibility to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the safety of their transport activities (HVNL ss. 26A–26C). These obligations mirror and directly align with the existing requirements embedded in the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (WHS Act), where businesses must eliminate or minimise risks through established and well-documented risk management processes (WHS Act ss. 17–19). The draft SMS Standard duplicates many of the processes already embedded within WHS management systems, particularly in relation to hazard identification, risk assessment, training and competency verification, incident reporting, maintenance standards, fatigue management protocols, and documentation retention. Operators are already required by law to demonstrate these processes, and they do so through integrated WHS, HR, fleet management, and quality systems. Requiring the development of additional, standalone HVNL-specific systems is not only unnecessary but inconsistent with contemporary risk-based regulation. Rather than enhancing safety outcomes, the draft requirements risk creating an administrative burden that diverts resources away from operational safety and toward paperwork, reformatting, and bureaucratic compliance. This concern is strongly supported by academic research. Peer-reviewed commentary, including works by Bluff (2014), Walters & Johnstone (2019), and Quinlan (2016), highlights that overlapping regulatory frameworks and duplicated safety documentation obligations can impose significant cost and administrative pressure on businesses without producing meaningful improvements in safety outcomes. Such duplication can actually hinder safety, as operators redirect time, money, and staff capacity toward compliance administration rather than practical, on-the-ground risk controls. These concerns are magnified by the current financial fragility of the transport sector. The industry is experiencing its highest rate of insolvency in decades, with operators consistently referencing regulatory complexity, rising insurance costs, increased compliance demands, fuel volatility, and tightening margins as primary causes. Several major and long-established transport businesses have collapsed in the past 24 months, demonstrating how additional regulatory burdens could push even more operators to the brink. Notable recent closures include Scott’s Refrigerated Logistics (2023), one of Australia’s largest cold-chain carriers; Riviana Transport (WA, 2023); Toll’s domestic energy logistics arm closure (2022–2023) affecting regional fuel haulage operations; and Cootes Transport’s exit from major markets, following escalating compliance costs and operational constraints. Each of these cases shows that even large operators with substantial infrastructure and financial oversight are struggling to remain viable under the weight of rising regulatory and operational cost pressures. The trend is even more pronounced among smaller and regional operators, many of whom have exited the industry quietly without media coverage. Insolvency data from ASIC and industry bodies consistently shows that transport, postal and warehousing sits among the top sectors for business failures. Introducing an additional layer of duplicated SMS documentation—not to improve safety, but to satisfy an administrative preference—risks accelerating this trend. For many operators, the compliance costs associated with Schedule 1, including external verification, system redesign, and internal administrative restructuring, may render their businesses financially unsustainable. In this context, it is difficult to justify an SMS framework that duplicates WHS obligations and offers no demonstrable safety benefit. The proposed SMS Standard and Schedule 1 requirements would impose expensive and unnecessary administrative load without meaningfully strengthening safety outcomes beyond those already achieved under integrated WHS, quality, and risk-management systems. At a time when the transport industry is experiencing unprecedented financial stress and a wave of business closures, the introduction of additional duplicated regulatory requirements could have severe unintended consequences, including reducing competition, increasing freight costs, and destabilising national supply chains.

• Consultation question – Section 4

  We strongly support the removal of split rest break provisions from the Heavy Vehicle National Law, the Alternative Fatigue Management (AFM) and Basic Fatigue Management (BFM) accreditation systems, and all associated Ministerial Standards. There is clear evidence that split rest creates fatigue unpredictability, disrupts circadian rhythms, and provides no measurable safety benefit. The proposed Ministerial Standard for Alternative Compliance Hours, particularly Section 4(b)(i), reinforces this position because it explicitly states that a driver or operator must not plan a trip around the use of split rest. This alone demonstrates that the NHVR recognises split rest as unsuitable for safe planning. If a provision is unsafe to use in trip planning, then its existence in legislation contradicts the fundamental principles of risk-based regulation and the NHVR’s own stated commitments to clarity, simplicity, and evidence-driven safety outcomes. Leaving a rest option available but prohibiting operators from planning around it creates ambiguity, undermines safety assurance, and conflicts with both WHS obligations and HVNL primary duties. For this reason, split rest should be entirely removed rather than selectively discouraged. Historical evidence and coronial findings strongly support this position. The NSW Coroner’s findings following the Mona Vale tanker crash demonstrated that fragmented sleep contributed to the driver’s fatigue, even though formal work/rest tables had been met. This case highlighted that compliance based on mathematical tables is not the same as achieving actual sleep-based recovery. In R v Petroulias (Qld, 2015), the Court also found that multiple short rest periods were inadequate to address cumulative fatigue, showing that fragmented sleep patterns do not provide restorative rest even when they technically fall within legal limits. Major crash analyses published annually by the National Transport Insurance (NTI) confirm that inconsistent, interrupted or broken rest is associated with elevated crash risk and delayed recovery times. Earlier research undertaken during the development of the original fatigue reforms, including the 2010–2013 National Transport Commission fatigue review, also confirmed that drivers using split rest patterns accumulated more sleep debt and demonstrated slower reaction times than drivers receiving consolidated sleep. These cases and investigations demonstrate that split rest not only fails to provide meaningful safety benefit but actively increases risk. Academic research further reinforces this conclusion. Studies by Williamson and Friswell (2017) show that split or broken sleep results in lower cognitive performance, impaired reaction times and greater subjective fatigue. Dawson, McCulloch and Chapman (2014) found that fragmented sleep reduces restorative value by up to 40 percent compared to a continuous rest period of equivalent length. Stevenson, Sharwood and Wong (2014) concluded that fatigue impairment is significantly more likely when sleep is broken or misaligned with natural circadian cycles. Bluff (2014) argued that regulatory models permitting fragmented rest contradict the core WHS obligation to eliminate or minimise risks so far as is reasonably practicable. These academic findings provide overwhelming evidence that split rest is incompatible with safe heavy vehicle operations. The current Ministerial Standard proposal, by stating that operators must plan their trips on the basis that split rest is not used, effectively acknowledges that split rests cannot form part of a safe fatigue-management strategy. A rest provision that cannot be incorporated into planning is inherently unsafe. Such an approach also creates enforcement uncertainty, because drivers may use split rest reactively in the field but cannot plan for it in advance. This places operators and drivers in a position where their compliance strategy must be based on contingencies rather than predictable rest cycles. This is inconsistent with the WHS obligation to ensure workers are not exposed to foreseeable risks and inconsistent with the HVNL’s primary duty to ensure safety so far as is reasonably practicable. It is also inconsistent with the NHVR’s repeated statements about improving regulatory certainty, harmonising fatigue rules, and simplifying compliance across jurisdictions. Replacing a proven, well-understood and widely adopted rest-break system with a new, unclear or contradictory model has historically led to unintended harm across multiple transport and safety-critical sectors. Senate inquiries into the Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal found that regulatory changes implemented without adequate evidence caused economic instability, operational confusion and widespread loss of trust in the enforcing agency. CASA’s fatigue rule changes in the aviation sector between 2012 and 2019 also demonstrated how altering a fatigue framework without sectoral support or proper testing created significant commercial impacts and undermined confidence in the regulator. The maritime transport reforms of 2012–2015, when long-standing regulatory models were replaced with newer but poorly aligned frameworks, resulted in several operators exiting the market and prompted criticism that government agencies had acted on incomplete advice. These examples show that when regulators move away from established systems without a robust evidence base, the result is often reduced safety performance, economic harm to operators and diminished regulatory credibility. Given the substantial coronial evidence, scientific literature, and real-world operational experience, it is clear that split rest breaks should not be retained in any HVNL or accreditation context. The regulator cannot ethically or logically maintain a fatigue option it simultaneously acknowledges is unsafe for planning. If the provision is unsuitable for planning, it is unsuitable for work. The only consistent and evidence-based course of action is to remove split rest entirely and replace it with continuous rest requirements that align with modern fatigue science and the foundational principles of WHS and HVNL primary duties. This approach will provide clarity, improve safety outcomes, reduce ambiguity in enforcement and restore confidence in the regulator’s commitment to evidence-based decision-making.

• Consultation question – Section 4(b)

  We strongly support the removal of split rest break provisions from the Heavy Vehicle National Law, the Alternative Fatigue Management (AFM) and Basic Fatigue Management (BFM) accreditation systems, and all associated Ministerial Standards. There is clear evidence that split rest creates fatigue unpredictability, disrupts circadian rhythms, and provides no measurable safety benefit. The proposed Ministerial Standard for Alternative Compliance Hours, particularly Section 4(b)(i), reinforces this position because it explicitly states that a driver or operator must not plan a trip around the use of split rest. This alone demonstrates that the NHVR recognises split rest as unsuitable for safe planning. If a provision is unsafe to use in trip planning, then its existence in legislation contradicts the fundamental principles of risk-based regulation and the NHVR’s own stated commitments to clarity, simplicity, and evidence-driven safety outcomes. Leaving a rest option available but prohibiting operators from planning around it creates ambiguity, undermines safety assurance, and conflicts with both WHS obligations and HVNL primary duties. For this reason, split rest should be entirely removed rather than selectively discouraged. Historical evidence and coronial findings strongly support this position. The NSW Coroner’s findings following the Mona Vale tanker crash demonstrated that fragmented sleep contributed to the driver’s fatigue, even though formal work/rest tables had been met. This case highlighted that compliance based on mathematical tables is not the same as achieving actual sleep-based recovery. In R v Petroulias (Qld, 2015), the Court also found that multiple short rest periods were inadequate to address cumulative fatigue, showing that fragmented sleep patterns do not provide restorative rest even when they technically fall within legal limits. Major crash analyses published annually by the National Transport Insurance (NTI) confirm that inconsistent, interrupted or broken rest is associated with elevated crash risk and delayed recovery times. Earlier research undertaken during the development of the original fatigue reforms, including the 2010–2013 National Transport Commission fatigue review, also confirmed that drivers using split rest patterns accumulated more sleep debt and demonstrated slower reaction times than drivers receiving consolidated sleep. These cases and investigations demonstrate that split rest not only fails to provide meaningful safety benefit but actively increases risk. Academic research further reinforces this conclusion. Studies by Williamson and Friswell (2017) show that split or broken sleep results in lower cognitive performance, impaired reaction times and greater subjective fatigue. Dawson, McCulloch and Chapman (2014) found that fragmented sleep reduces restorative value by up to 40 percent compared to a continuous rest period of equivalent length. Stevenson, Sharwood and Wong (2014) concluded that fatigue impairment is significantly more likely when sleep is broken or misaligned with natural circadian cycles. Bluff (2014) argued that regulatory models permitting fragmented rest contradict the core WHS obligation to eliminate or minimise risks so far as is reasonably practicable. These academic findings provide overwhelming evidence that split rest is incompatible with safe heavy vehicle operations. The current Ministerial Standard proposal, by stating that operators must plan their trips on the basis that split rest is not used, effectively acknowledges that split rests cannot form part of a safe fatigue-management strategy. A rest provision that cannot be incorporated into planning is inherently unsafe. Such an approach also creates enforcement uncertainty, because drivers may use split rest reactively in the field but cannot plan for it in advance. This places operators and drivers in a position where their compliance strategy must be based on contingencies rather than predictable rest cycles. This is inconsistent with the WHS obligation to ensure workers are not exposed to foreseeable risks and inconsistent with the HVNL’s primary duty to ensure safety so far as is reasonably practicable. It is also inconsistent with the NHVR’s repeated statements about improving regulatory certainty, harmonising fatigue rules, and simplifying compliance across jurisdictions. Replacing a proven, well-understood and widely adopted rest-break system with a new, unclear or contradictory model has historically led to unintended harm across multiple transport and safety-critical sectors. Senate inquiries into the Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal found that regulatory changes implemented without adequate evidence caused economic instability, operational confusion and widespread loss of trust in the enforcing agency. CASA’s fatigue rule changes in the aviation sector between 2012 and 2019 also demonstrated how altering a fatigue framework without sectoral support or proper testing created significant commercial impacts and undermined confidence in the regulator. The maritime transport reforms of 2012–2015, when long-standing regulatory models were replaced with newer but poorly aligned frameworks, resulted in several operators exiting the market and prompted criticism that government agencies had acted on incomplete advice. These examples show that when regulators move away from established systems without a robust evidence base, the result is often reduced safety performance, economic harm to operators and diminished regulatory credibility. Given the substantial coronial evidence, scientific literature, and real-world operational experience, it is clear that split rest breaks should not be retained in any HVNL or accreditation context. The regulator cannot ethically or logically maintain a fatigue option it simultaneously acknowledges is unsafe for planning. If the provision is unsuitable for planning, it is unsuitable for work. The only consistent and evidence-based course of action is to remove split rest entirely and replace it with continuous rest requirements that align with modern fatigue science and the foundational principles of WHS and HVNL primary duties. This approach will provide clarity, improve safety outcomes, reduce ambiguity in enforcement and restore confidence in the regulator’s commitment to evidence-based decision-making.

• Consultation question – General

  With respect to the Ministerial Standard for Alternative Compliance Hours, I support the view that transparency in the Regulator’s decision-making should be managed through the Ministerial Statement of Expectations rather than embedded within the Standard itself. Transparency is essential for maintaining trust between industry, drivers, operators, and the Regulator. It ensures that compliance decisions are understood, consistently applied, and aligned with the principles of good governance. However, incorporating transparency requirements directly into the Standard risks diluting its core purpose and creating unnecessary complexity. The Ministerial Standard is intended to clearly define work and rest hours, ensuring operators and drivers have simple, unambiguous rules for fatigue management. Introducing transparency obligations into this document would expand its scope beyond operational requirements and potentially cause confusion about what elements relate to fatigue compliance versus administrative governance. By comparison, the Statement of Expectations is specifically designed to articulate Ministers’ expectations of the Regulator, including transparency, accountability, responsiveness, and stakeholder engagement. Using this mechanism keeps regulatory functions appropriately separated and aligned with contemporary governance practice. Furthermore, the Statement of Expectations provides greater flexibility for Ministers to refine or update transparency requirements without needing to amend the Standard itself. This ensures that governance expectations can evolve in response to industry feedback, emerging risks, or changes in regulatory practice, while the fatigue rules remain stable, consistent, and easier for drivers to comply with. Retaining this separation reduces administrative burdens, avoids duplication, and supports a clearer and more efficient regulatory framework. For these reasons, I support the NTC position that transparency obligations are best managed through the Ministerial Statement of Expectations. This approach maintains clarity, strengthens accountability, and ensures the Standard remains focused solely on safe and effective work and rest arrangements.

• Do you have any feedback specific to the draft Ministerial Guidelines for Heavy Vehicle Accreditation?

  The draft framework appears to rely heavily on assumptions of systemic, widespread non-compliance across the transport industry. Yet available compliance data under both the Heavy Vehicle National Law (HVNL) and the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (WHS Act) does not support such an escalated regulatory response. Academic research has consistently found that the majority of safety failures stem not from the broader industry, but from a small number of persistently high-risk operators or from structural supply-chain pressures outside the control of most businesses (Quinlan, 2016; Stevenson et al., 2014; Bluff, 2014). Designing Ministerial Guidelines on the basis that the entire industry is non-compliant is therefore disproportionate and risks unfairly penalising responsible operators who already invest heavily in robust safety systems. This issue is not new. Political history shows several instances where ministers have acted on incomplete, incorrect or one-sided advice, resulting in unintended harm to the very industries they are responsible for. The 2016 abolition of the Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal (RSRT), for example, followed widespread criticism that the Tribunal’s orders—developed from limited consultation—were destabilising the small-business transport sector. The Senate Committee report later noted that policy decisions had been made based on “insufficient industry impact assessment,” leading to financial stress, contract downturns and business closures across owner-driver networks. Similarly, the 2020 Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport (RRAT) Committee highlighted that several regulatory proposals affecting freight had been developed using “selective evidence that failed to consider real-world operational constraints.” More recently, state-based inquiries into freight productivity have criticised ministers for acting on “bureaucratic advice that did not reflect industry capacity or on-ground conditions,” leading to increased compliance burdens with no measurable safety gains. These political precedents demonstrate the consequences of regulatory design that is disconnected from actual industry needs—or built on inaccurate assumptions. The proposed Ministerial Guidelines continue this pattern by failing to align with the operational realities of transport businesses. Whether a small owner-driver or a large freight company, operators require regulatory frameworks that are practical, workable and genuinely supportive of day-to-day operations. Instead, the draft Guidelines introduce obligations that are excessively administrative, disconnected from modern logistics workflows, difficult for regional or resource-sector operators to implement, and fundamentally misaligned with existing WHS-mandated safety practices. This creates an unnecessarily complex regulatory environment that does not reflect how freight operations, labour availability, scheduling constraints, or supply-chain pressures function in the real world. A central concern is that the proposal duplicates obligations already required under the HVNL and the WHS Act. The HVNL’s primary duty provisions (ss. 26A–26C) directly mirror the WHS Act’s mandate to eliminate or minimise risks so far as is reasonably practicable (ss. 17–19). Yet the proposed accreditation requirements simply restate duties operators already meet: risk management, training and competency, incident investigation, hazard control, and extensive record-keeping. This duplication introduces unnecessary regulatory overlap, administrative inefficiencies and substantial compliance costs, particularly for small and medium operators who do not have internal compliance departments. Rather than improving safety outcomes, these additional administrative layers threaten business viability by forcing operators to absorb higher costs without any corresponding operational benefit. The proposal also appears disconnected from genuine industry evidence and lacks alignment with decades of stakeholder consultation. The tone and structure of the Guidelines suggest an underlying regulatory distrust that is inconsistent with the industry’s demonstrated safety maturity and investment in continuous improvement. Operators have long called for harmonised legislation, reduced duplication between HVNL and WHS requirements, scalable safety systems appropriate to business size, and a risk-based regulatory framework that targets poor performers rather than penalising compliant operators. Despite these consistent themes, the current proposal does not incorporate these long-standing recommendations. Instead, it appears to have been informed by selective or incomplete evidence, resulting in a model that is out of step with the operational realities of transport work and the economic pressures currently destabilising the industry. Taken together, the draft Guidelines risk repeating the mistakes highlighted in multiple political inquiries and industry reviews: acting on incorrect or incomplete advice, imposing reforms that are disconnected from reality, and generating unintended consequences that directly harm the very sector they are meant to support

• Do you have any feedback specific to the draft National Audit Standard (NAS)?

  Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft National Audit Standard (NAS). While I recognise the NHVR’s objective to improve the consistency and reliability of accreditation audits, I have serious concerns that the proposed framework moves away from the internationally recognised purpose of an accreditation audit and risks undermining both the integrity of the audit process and the viability of accredited operators. As drafted, the NAS reflects an enforcement-based approach rather than the accepted practice of system evaluation, and this shift is inconsistent with both industry expectations and global auditing standards. International standards such as ISO 9001 (Quality Management Systems), ISO 45001 (Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems) and ISO 19011 (Guidelines for Auditing Management Systems) make it clear that the purpose of an accreditation audit is to assess whether a management system is implemented, functioning as intended, and capable of identifying risks and implementing corrective actions. In other words, an audit determines whether the system is effective—not whether an operator has achieved flawless, incident-free performance. Safety management systems do not eliminate all non-compliance events; they provide the structure for detecting, analysing and rectifying issues when they arise. The draft NAS departs from this principle by turning the audit into a search for compliance breaches rather than an evaluation of system capability, which is inconsistent with the fundamental intent of management system auditing. A key problem with the draft NAS is that it attempts to convert a qualitative audit into a quantitative compliance inspection. ISO-based audits evaluate quality, design and operational effectiveness through a process-based, risk-based, qualitative approach. They are not numerical scoring exercises, nor are they designed to count defects or examine isolated events in isolation from the broader system. The draft NAS, however, appears to emphasise the discovery and reporting of individual non-conformities as if the auditor is performing an enforcement inspection rather than a system assessment. This approach not only conflicts with ISO methodology but also risks creating punitive, inconsistent and subjective audit outcomes that do not genuinely reflect system effectiveness. A particularly troubling aspect of the proposed NAS is the expectation that auditors report suspected non-compliance or perceived public safety risks directly to the NHVR. This requirement effectively transforms an accreditation auditor into an NHVR inspector, despite auditors not having the powers, protections or legal standing of authorised officers under the Heavy Vehicle National Law (HVNL). This expectation breaches core ethical principles outlined in ISO 19011, which clearly require auditors to maintain independence, impartiality, confidentiality and trust. When auditors are made to act as enforcement agents, the audit process becomes adversarial, organisations become reluctant to disclose issues, and the fundamental purpose of continuous improvement is compromised. This shift also contradicts the role of accreditation within the broader regulatory framework. Accreditation systems—whether under HVNL, ISO or WHS legislation—exist to recognise organisations with effective systems, reduce regulatory duplication, and support risk-based oversight. The draft NAS, by contrast, introduces an approach that is more punitive, more administratively intensive and more duplicative of existing obligations under both the HVNL and the Work Health and Safety Act 2011. Academic research published through Google Scholar (including works by Bluff, Walters & Johnstone, and Quinlan) consistently shows that when audits are designed or executed as enforcement tools rather than system evaluations, safety culture deteriorates, under-reporting increases and trust in the regulatory system declines. Instead of strengthening safety outcomes, the draft NAS risks driving operators away from accreditation altogether because the costs, risks and administrative burdens will outweigh the benefits. From an industry perspective, the proposed NAS creates significant concerns about cost, fairness and viability. Placing auditors in the role of enforcement agents will substantially increase audit preparation requirements, compel operators to seek legal review prior to audits, and disproportionately impact small and regional transport businesses. The likely result is reduced industry participation in accreditation, an erosion of trust between operators and auditors, and a decline in the cooperative, improvement-driven culture that accreditation is meant to foster. For these reasons, the draft NAS requires substantial revision. The final standard should be fully aligned with ISO 19011 audit principles, ensuring the audit remains a qualitative and system-based evaluation rather than a quantitative compliance inspection. The requirement for auditors to report suspected breaches to the NHVR should be removed entirely, as it compromises auditor independence and contradicts established ethics. The standard must also be aligned with existing WHS and HVNL duties to avoid duplication, excessive administration and unnecessary costs. Most importantly, the purpose of accreditation audits should be reaffirmed: to assess whether systems are functioning as intended and capable of managing risk, not to penalise operators for vulnerabilities that the system itself has already identified and addressed. If adopted without amendment, the draft NAS risks undermining the credibility of the accreditation program, discouraging participation, and damaging the cooperative safety culture that the transport industry has worked hard to build. A revised, ISO-aligned audit standard will better support both safety improvement and the long-term viability of operators who rely on clear, fair and effective regulatory framework

• Do you have any feedback specific to the draft Ministerial Standard for Alternative Compliance Hours?

  While the objective of improving fatigue management and ensuring safety is understood, I hold serious concerns that the proposed framework seeks to replace a long-established, proven and accepted system with a model that lacks the same level of industry testing, operational practicality and evidence base. Such a shift has the potential to impose substantial economic strain on operators, destabilise scheduling practices, and ultimately erode confidence in the regulator responsible for overseeing its enforcement. Across multiple sectors—both in Australia and internationally—political reports and government inquiries have repeatedly shown that replacing well-established regulatory systems with new, untested frameworks can produce severe economic and operational disruption. The Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport (RRAT) Committee, 2018–2021 warned that rapid regulatory changes in transport, particularly where policy is shaped by incomplete or selective evidence, can make an entire sector uneconomic by increasing compliance costs, reducing productivity and undermining industry trust. The Productivity Commission (PC) has similarly documented that abrupt shifts from longstanding regulatory models have historically harmed freight productivity and damaged the reputation of enforcement bodies when reforms are poorly designed or inadequately tested. Comparable examples exist in other industries. The 2014–2016 changes to the Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal (RSRT)—based on flawed assumptions and incomplete modelling—created economic shockwaves across the road transport sector, particularly for small operators. The Senate later found that abandoning the established payment and contracting system in favour of a new imposed model resulted in business closures, financial distress, and long-term distrust of government oversight. Likewise, reforms in the maritime and coastal shipping sector during 2012–2015 led to instability after replacing proven regulatory processes with new rules that were not operationally matched to industry realities; multiple operators cited these changes as contributing to their exit from the market. In the aviation sector, the CASA fatigue rule changes (2012–2019) similarly demonstrated how shifting away from well-tested systems without adequate consultation or transitional planning caused significant economic impact, flight cancellations, and a documented loss of confidence in the regulator’s competency. These historical cases are relevant because the draft Ministerial Standard for Alternative Compliance Hours appears to ignore similar lessons. The existing fatigue management framework—particularly AFM and BFM—has been widely adopted, tested over many years, audited through established processes and recognised in court proceedings as a reliable, defendable system. Replacing this with a new, rigid and prescriptive model risks compromising operational practicality, reducing flexibility, and making compliance considerably more difficult for businesses that operate across long distances, regional areas, resource-sector haulage or multi-shift environments. The draft Standard also appears to be based on assumptions that existing fatigue management practices are fundamentally inadequate or unsafe. However, available HVNL compliance data does not support such a conclusion. Operators functioning under AFM, BFM or well-designed WHS-aligned fatigue systems have demonstrated strong safety performance. Academic studies (Quinlan, Bluff, Walters & Johnstone) consistently show that fatigue-related incidents arise more often from systemic supply-chain pressure or a small number of high-risk operators, not from the broader industry that has effectively applied the current framework. Reforming an entire national system based on the conduct of a minority inevitably produces a disproportionate regulatory outcome. Furthermore, altering the fatigue rules in a way that increases complexity, reduces operational adaptability, or imposes additional scheduling restrictions will have immediate economic impact. Fatigue rules directly determine freight efficiency, delivery windows, rest-break scheduling, staffing requirements and contractual viability. If the proposed model reduces available working windows, increases the administrative burden, or restricts task sequencing, it will reduce productivity and increase operating costs. In a sector already facing high insolvency rates, increasing debt levels, rising insurance premiums and narrowing profit margins, such changes could make many businesses economically unsustainable. Historical cases—such as the collapse of Scott’s Refrigerated Logistics (2023), Riviana Transport (2023), and multiple smaller operators documented in ASIC insolvency statistics—show that even slight regulatory or cost shifts can push operators into failure. If alternative hours are mandated without flexibility, transitional support, or alignment with existing systems, the regulator risks reputational damage similar to that documented in Senate inquiries into RSRT and CASA. Regulatory bodies lose credibility when industry perceives that reforms are developed without adequate evidence, without genuine consultation, and without operational understanding of the sectors they are regulating. The transport sector is already facing significant pressure; replacing long-established systems with new ones that lack industry support or proof of improved safety outcomes would only deepen that strain. For these reasons, I strongly urge reconsideration of the draft Ministerial Standard. Any reform of fatigue requirements must be supported by robust evidence, industry-tested modelling, genuine consultation, and careful evaluation of the economic impacts. Most importantly, it must not dismantle a proven system without compelling justification. To do so would risk making transport operations uneconomical and undermine confidence in the regulator at a time when stability, clarity and partnership are crucial to sustaining safe and viable freight services.